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Abstract 
This chapter looks at the question of global constitutionalism and East Asia in a context 
of political economy. It raises the concern about the mutually reinforcing relationship 
between global constitutionalism and neoliberalism. This nexus is explained as lying in 
the insistence of the separation of the public and the private in both constitutionalism and 
neoliberalism. It is considered whether global constitutionalism’s predisposition towards 
neoliberalism (in the sense of a privileging of the separation of the state from the market 
and with that a separation of the political from the economy) would be strengthened and 
deepened through its extension to East Asia. Or, alternatively, could this new dialogue 
provide an opportunity for ‘decolonising’ global constitutionalism and its political 
economic bias? 
 
Introduction 
Global constitutionalism is, in a manner of speaking, unchartered territory for East Asia. 
In the following, I explore the potential consequences of expanding the debate on global 
constitutionalism to East Asia. While there is the potential of enriching the debate through 
this geographical expansion, there is also a danger that it could further naturalise an 
already dominant form of political-economic organisation, namely neoliberalism.  
 Not only has political economy been a neglected site of inquiry in the debate on global 
constitutionalism, and therefore merits further exploration in itself, it is an issue which 
becomes particularly pertinent in conversation with East Asian perspectives on global 
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constitutionalism.1  The argument is built on the assumption that consensus between 
Western and Asian actors is often sought in commercial relations (doing business 
together). On this assumption, a consequence of a global constitutional debate could be 
the further depoliticisation of the dominant mutual language of business.  
 It is no secret that global constitutionalism has, to date, been a debate largely confined 
to European origins and audiences, with particular enthusiasm expressed by German 
scholars.2 It is also no secret that the debate on global constitutionalism has largely been 
a values-oriented debate, foregrounding the search for a common normative agenda.3 
Superficially, these two features of the dominant global constitutional orientation already 
have exclusionary effects for East Asian scholars and practitioners: Seemingly, it is a 
debate taking place outside of its geography, and given the foregrounding of both 
territorial sovereignty and an enduring ‘Asian values’ understanding of several East Asian 
states, a universal norms debate is politically (and ideologically) seemingly a dead-end. 
Depending on one’s point of view, one could label this type of exclusionary effect as 
‘hegemony’, a colonial hangover from the Western perspective. Alternatively, one could 
label it as nationalist and isolationist from an East Asian perspective. Regardless, the 
global constitutional debate in an East Asian context does, to date, not carry much 
momentum. The unequal distribution of global constitutional scholars in Europe vis-à-
vis other parts of the world appears to be perpetuating this exclusionary effect. This 
collection of essays is therefore very welcome in beginning a debate which extends 
beyond this geographical (and ideological) bias. And yet, apart from a positive 
diversifying of the debate, it also seems that much is at stake with this conversation. 
 This chapter voices the concern that the dialogue on global constitutionalism between 
                                                        
1 As with all geographical and cultural references of this scope, the term ‘East Asia’ is difficult to define or 
to fix. East Asia is often taken to mean the ten ASEAN member countries (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam), and China, Japan 
and Korea, the so-called ASEAN Plus Three. Depending on the issue, it may include some neighbouring 
countries. Tamio Nakamura (ed.), East Asian Regionalism from Legal Perspective: current features and a 
vision for the future (London: Routledge 2009). According to the Project Framing Paper, this project is 
particularly interested in the ASEAN Plus Three. (Framing Paper on file with the author). 
2 Among others, see work by Bardo Fassbender, Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Mattias Kumm, Stefan Oeter, 
Anne Peters, Antje Wiener, and this author included. 
3 This includes ideas of particular human rights, jus cogens norms, and other treaty norms as constitutional. 
Notwithstanding an emphasis by some authors on procedure over substance (see Anne Peters, 
‘Constitutional Fragments: On the Interaction of Constitutionalization and Fragmentation of International 
Law’ Centre for Global Constitutionalism University of St. Andrews Working Paper 2015, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2591370). 
  3 
international lawyers from the West and international lawyers from East Asia could 
further naturalise neoliberal biases and forms of organisation. My concern about this 
potential is based on two observations: First, that the dominant ideas of global 
constitutionalism, although diverse and multiform, all share the liberal tenet of the 
separation between public and private authority, which is mapped onto a separation of 
political and economic activity and state and civil society. This separation privileges the 
deregulation and ultimately the depoliticisation of private economic activity – one of the 
main precepts of neoliberalism. Given that the conversation with East Asian international 
lawyers on global constitutionalism is unlikely to take place on the footing of a common 
values debate (regardless of whether this is a good or bad thing), it means that a debate 
would most likely take place on an economic basis. Despite the differences between the 
states in question and their approach to political economy, they nevertheless appear to 
agree on the division of political and economic activity in law and international relations. 
 The second observation concerns the almost universal reach of neoliberalism as the 
dominant business model as well as its pervasiveness beyond business, reaching to all 
aspects of life. Neoliberalism is a term commonly used to describe the political-economic 
form of organisation which prioritises private property and enterprise over public goods, 
has a preoccupation with markets and profits, with the individual (and individual 
freedoms), furthers a declining appreciation and understanding of ideas of community 
and commonality, and consequently the domination of a small class of ruling elite who 
have gained and maintained their wealth at the expense of the rest. These priorities are 
not only evident in commercial relations (the so-called private sphere of legal relations) 
but are also becoming more and more evident in previously public spaces such as health 
care, education, and other public and social services. East Asia occupies an interesting 
space here – and certainly China’s economic model of a so-called socialist market 
economy could not be described as neoliberalism in the ‘Washington Consensus’ sense 
of the term.4 What the East Asian economies, including China, have in common with 
neoliberalism, however, is a general consensus on ‘the need for less government 
                                                        
4 The Washington Consensus is a set of economic policy prescriptions agreed upon by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the US Treasury Department (all based in Washington DC) 
which promote a strongly market-based approach to international relations and development. 
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intervention in the economy and greater political openness’.5  
 Could, therefore, a dialogue between East and West on global constitutionalism have 
the effect of strengthening the global appeal of neoliberalism? Global constitutionalism 
in this sense would act as a vehicle for neoliberalism, squeezing out any space for 
resistance or dissent. Or, alternatively, and more optimistically, does this dialogue 
provide an opportunity? Given the differing economic and political means of 
organisation, could global constitutionalism, through an impetus from East Asia, be 
‘decolonised’, freeing it of its liberal-democratic assumptions, bringing the economic into 
political debates and ultimately providing a space for considering alternative political-
economic models? 
 
1. Global constitutionalism and international law and political economy 
Establishing a link between global constitutionalism and political economy arguably 
becomes clearer with a step-by-step analysis of (a) enquiring into the link between global 
constitutionalism and international law, then (b) the link between international law and 
political economy and finally (c) the relationship between global constitutionalism and 
political economy.  
1.1 Global constitutionalism and international law 
The debate on global constitutionalism is interdisciplinary, spanning political theory, 
international relations, social sciences, and international law.  However, much of the 
debate and many of the leading voices in the debate are rooted in international law.6 This 
provides global constitutionalism with a distinctly normative, as opposed to a descriptive, 
flavour. The debate on global constitutionalism is, therefore, largely about questions of 
how constitutional features (the rule of law, democracy, human rights) can be applied in 
a global context for standard-setting and problem-solving purposes. The question at the 
heart of this is: Can global constitutionalism contribute to addressing some of the world’s 
largest problems? In other words, can it contribute to a more equal, prosperous, 
sustainable, and overall better life for humankind? And it is laudable to pose these 
questions. These are, after all, a set of questions which demonstrate a desire for harmony 
among people based on a common fabric, whatever that may be. On this basis, global 
                                                        
5 He Li, ‘The Chinese Path of Economic Reform and Its Implications’ (2005) 31 Asian Affairs 195. 
6 Influential scholars from outside international law include Anthony Lang, Antje Wiener, Michael Zürn. 
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constitutionalism has been described as one of the ‘master narratives’ of international 
law, which attempts to construct ‘meaningful totalities out of scattered events.’7  
 I have previously argued that, although diverse and multiform, the predominant global 
constitutionalism projects from an international legal perspective share some important 
properties in the privileging of: (a) the limitation of power, (b) the institutionalisation of 
power, (c) social idealism (meaning an idea for the future based on societal values), (d) 
the standard-setting capacity of constitutions in the sense of a systematisation of law, and 
(e) the recognition of individual rights.8  In these constitutional traditions, the listed 
features all form part of public law, i.e. the area of law which is regulated by the state and 
concerns relations between the state and individuals. Together, these features can further 
be condensed to a general liberal democratic idea of global constitutionalism as the pre-
eminent interpretation of global constitutionalism among international lawyers today.9 
This should, in and of itself, not be surprising. It is after all the extrapolation of national 
constitutional principles, largely originating in the French Constitution of the first French 
Republic, the United States Constitution, and the post World War II German Constitution, 
which have been reproduced in many constitutions across the world.  
 However, these constitutional principles need to be placed into both a colonial as well 
as an ideological context. Although it may not be directly intended by the participants to 
the debate, global constitutionalism has the potential to act as a vehicle of hegemony 
through the engagement of a civilising rhetoric. Global constitutionalism is an idea which 
purports to be universal, yet it is a debate largely originating in Europe and entrenched in 
European Enlightenment thinking. It therefore sits comfortably in a progress narrative 
which subscribes to the progressive nature of European legal thought and suggests the 
application of this thought to the non-European world. The legal nature of this form of 
universalism is important since it implies a form of sanction/enforcement should a 
violation/non-compliance be determined.  
                                                        
7  Matthew Windsor references Ricoeur’s distinction between narrative’s successional (progress) and 
configurational (totalities) dimensions in this context. Matthew Windsor, ‘Narrative Kill or Capture: 
Unreliable Narration in International Law’ (2015) 28 Leiden Journal of International Law 748. See Paul 
Ricoeur, ‘The Narrative Function’, in John B. Thompson  (ed.), Hermeneutics & The Human Sciences 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 274. I would argue that constitutionalism has both 
successional as well as configurational dimensions.  
8  Christine Schwöbel, Global Constitutionalism in International Legal Perspective (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff/Brill, 2011). 
9 Schwöbel (n. 8). 
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 As we have learned from recent scholarship in international law, the discipline and its 
central principles were not only constituted by asymmetries of power between colonial 
powers and colonial subjects but continue to create and naturalise these asymmetries. 
Antony Anghie, a critical legal historian and leading figure of the critical orientation 
which calls itself Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), argues that 
the international legal order was founded on a structural bias of differentiation between 
European and non-European states beginning in the 16th century. Anghie places the 
colonial encounter as a crucial time in which such differentiation was established. The 
European standard of civilisation was, as Anghie found, the standard by which non-
European countries (in particular Latin American colonies) were measured. ‘Technical’ 
terms or terms of expertise, most notably ‘sovereignty’, helped institutionalise and 
naturalise a division between what was considered civilised and what was considered 
uncivilised. This ‘dynamic of difference’, according to Anghie, continues to be the basis 
of exploitation of the global South.10  
 Those sceptical of the contemporary relevance of hegemony and exploitation often 
refer to the consensual nature of international law, stating that treaties are entered into 
under the assumption of the parity of the parties involved. What this argument often 
overlooks are the hidden financial pressures (sometimes in the form of development aid), 
memoranda of understanding, and other dependencies which form the basis of these 
quasi-contractual and seemingly equal exchanges. Regardless of whether one is sceptical 
of the relevance of hegemony in the international sphere, it cannot be denied that global 
constitutionalism’s close relationship with the discipline of international law and its 
rhetoric of universalism offers a potent vehicle for the more problematic sides of 
Eurocentricism.  
 
In the past years, perhaps as a response to the recognition of the Eurocentric nature of the 
global constitutional debate, there has emerged both a discontent about global 
                                                        
10  Anthony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). See also Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: 
Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011); Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third 
World Resistance  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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constitutionalism,11 as well as growing purchase of pluralism as opposed to hierarchy in 
constitutionalism. In light of a changed international and national landscape, Nico Krisch 
proposes a conceptualisation of pluralism to make sense of the new legal ordering. Instead 
of hierarchy, pluralism, according to Krisch, enables ongoing contestation and open-
endedness for principles.12 The rise of critical voices and the continued search for other 
legal principles to make sense of a diverse and decentered world, has led to global 
constitutionalism taking on a slightly different, less hierarchical tone.13 Some are already 
declaring the debate on global constitutionalism outdated.14 It seems, however, that there 
will continue to be rises and falls, trends and countertrends in this debate. Whether we 
are riding a wave of rising or of falling appeal to global constitutionalism will in part 
depend on what the most pressing issues of international law and politics are. In the 
current trend of increased nationalism, we may soon be experiencing a renewed interest 
in the supposedly unifying language of global constitutionalism. In any event, global 
constitutionalism remains a largely theoretical debate which is shaped by current affairs, 
even if this is unconsciously so. 
1.2 International law and political economy 
David Kennedy has observed that the central questions today are not political questions 
(regarding questions to be addressed by governments alone) and they are not economic 
questions (regarding questions to be addressed by the operations of markets alone) but 
rather they concern questions which can best be addressed by ‘thinking of politics and 
economics as intertwined projects and close collaborators in the distribution of political 
                                                        
11 There are varying forms of critique and reengagement. Examples of a critical stance include Richard 
Collins, ‘Constitutionalism as Liberal-Juridical Consciousness: Echoes from International Law’s Past’ 
(2009) 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 251-288; Schwöbel, (n. 8); Kolja Möller, ‘Formwandel des 
Konstitutionalismus. Zum Verhältnis von Postdemokratie und Verfassungsbildung jedenseits des Staates’, 
(2015) Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 270-289. 
12 Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010); Alec Stone Sweet claims that the distinction between constitutionalism and 
pluralism is in fact a ‘false dichotomy’ A. Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and 
International Regimes’ (2009) 16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 621-645. 
13 See also the recent special edition in the journal Global Constitutionalism on Julia Morse and Robert 
Keohane’s conception of ‘contested multilateralism’ and global constitutionalism (2016) 5 Global 
Constitutionalism 295-350. See also Julia Morse and Robert Keohane, ‘Contested Multilateralism’ (2014) 
9(4) Review of International Organizations 385-412. Contested multilateralism concerns the claim that new 
institutions are developing to challenge the institutional status quo. 
14 Global constitutionalism has been described as no longer ‘fashionable’, Thomas Kleinlein, ‘Between 
Myths and Norms: Constructivist Constitutionalism and the Potential of Constitutional Principles in 
International Law’ (2012) 81 Nordic Journal of International Law 79-132. 
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authority and economic reward’.15 The political economy of international law is a topic 
which has only recently attracted attention among international lawyers, largely as a 
delayed response to globalisation and the attendant growth of relevant organisations and 
practices. In international law, this is mostly captured in the sub-disciplines of 
international economic law, as the law regulating cross-border and business transactions, 
and international investment law, as the law regulating behaviour of foreign investors and 
sovereign states. Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel Trachtmann have argued that the relationship 
between globalisation (the process of an increase in the flow of people, capital, goods, 
services, and ideas across borders) and international law, is ‘mutually reinforcing’. The 
activities associated with globalisation increase the demand for international law, 
particularly international economic law, and in turn international economic law facilitates 
the international flow of goods, capital, people and ideas.16 This mutual reinforcement 
implies a win-win situation for market liberalisation: Government restrictions become 
increasingly relaxed through a ceding of sovereignty to international organisations and 
rules, the environment for privatisation is improved through deregulation, competitive 
forces decide on the success or failure of enterprise, wages are suppressed. The state has 
a crucial role in this, at once expected to construct walls around the market as well as 
expected to not interfere with these walls once they are erected. 
 
[The state] must set up those military, defence, police and legal 
structures and functions required to secure private property 
rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper 
functioning of markets. […] State interventions in markets (once 
created) must be kept to a bare minimum […]’.17  
 
International institutions have fixed these economic preferences and the role of the state 
in it in particular at the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
This economic programme, associated with several post World War II phenomena and 
                                                        
15 David Kennedy, ‘Law and Political Economy of the World’ (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 7-48, at 7-8. 
16 Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachman (eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, 
and Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 5. 
17 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 2. 
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the Chicago economists Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, is today mostly referred 
to as neoliberalism. Neoliberalism from this vantage point of structural programmes 
which become naturalised in the economic and then the non-economic sphere in order to 
protect the interests of a capitalist class is to be understood as a political project.18 
 It is worth noting that a strict adherence to this economic programme is largely 
recommended for and required of developing countries. 19  While the Western 
industrialised countries often adopt protectionist measures (government subsidies, trade 
tariffs, restricted patents) which allow them to privilege some of their national products 
and services without subjecting them to the tough global competitive market. 20  US 
agricultural subsidies are one example of this double-standard. This is often described as 
socialism for the rich, capitalism for the poor. 
 As Claire Cutler expertly argues in Private Power and Global Authority, international 
law and neoliberalism are not only mutually reinforcing but the former is effectively 
rendering private economic activity ‘apolitical’ and neutral.21 Particularly since the end 
of the Cold War, globalisation has accelerated and taken on the cloak of neoliberalism. 
What was previously regarded as the economic theory, or even ideology, of neoliberalism 
has been transformed into common-sense. Constitutionalism comes into this equation as 
a governance project at the local, regional and global level. It is the ‘juridical foundation 
for the global expansion of capitalism’.22 Culter and Gill identify the ways in which 
constitutionalism institutionalises neoliberalism at all these levels, employing the concept 
of ‘new constitutionalism’. 23  For them, ‘new constitutionalism’ is a project which 
institutionalises the huge contradictions and crises which form part of the neoliberal 
political project. The social forces and practices which constitute neoliberalism include, 
for example, increases in inequality, despite the accumulation of capital, and the 
                                                        
18 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (n. 17), p. 2. 
19 In the narrow meaning of the ‘Washington Consensus’ as set out by John Williamson in 1990 ‘to refer 
to the lowest common denominator of policy advice being addressed by the Washington-based institutions 
to Latin American countries as of 1989’ [www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html]. 
20 Ha-Joon Chang, Bad Samaritans: The Guilty Secrets of Rich Nations and the Threat to Global Prosperity 
(London: Random House Business, 2008). 
21 A. Claire Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global 
Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
22 A. Claire Cutler, ‘New constitutionalism and the commodity form of global capitalism’ in Stephen Gill 
and A. Claire Cutler (eds.) New Constitutionalism and World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), p. 45. 
23 Gill and Claire Cutler (eds.), New Constitutionalism and World Order (n. 22), p. 3.  
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socialisation of large investors and firms, despite the free movement of capital. But, 
Cutler and Gill also trace resistance to such ‘new constitutionalism’ in the form of 
contestation, innovation and transformation.  
 It is widely acknowledged by international organisations 24 , civil society 
organisations,25 and economists alike,26  that neoliberalism is experiencing a crisis of 
sorts. Most notably, the IMF has itself published reports which question its utility, 
particularly in terms of its propensity to increase income inequality.27 Not only did the 
global financial crisis expose the weaknesses of a global neoliberal capitalist model, more 
importantly, neoliberalism is causing deep income inequalities. The rich are becoming 
richer and the poor are becoming poorer. And arguably, what begins as financial crisis 
can spill over into conflict and social upheaval.28 With law standing at the heart of the 
neoliberal model, it seems that much is at stake to unsettle the taken for granted and 
common sense attitude of lawyers to neoliberalism. This also means questioning the 
instrumental place that such revered notions as ‘constitutionalism’ can have in creating a 
deeply socially unjust structure. 
1.3 Global constitutionalism and political economy 
Applying, then, the emerging debates on the connections between international law and 
political economy to global constitutionalism may reveal the inner workings and biases 
of the global constitutional debate. The Framing Paper for this project names the 
following keywords: sovereignty, nation state, global legal order, global or international 
constitutionalism, constitutional pluralism, regional integration, public international law, 
international economic law, World Trade Organization (WTO), free trade agreement, 
                                                        
24  ‘In it Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All’, 21 May 2015, OECD report 
http://www.oecd.org/social/in-it-together-why-less-inequality-benefits-all-9789264235120-en.htm. 
25 ‘An Economy for the 1%. How privilege and power in the economy drive extreme inequality and how 
this can be stopped’, 18 January 2016, Oxfam report on structural inequalities http://policy-
practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/an-economy-for-the-1-how-privilege-and-power-in-the-economy-
drive-extreme-inequ-592643. 
26 Thomas Piketty’s book Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2014) 
was particularly influential. 
27 Jonathan D. Ostry, Prakash Loungani, Davide Furceri, ‘Neoliberalims: Oversold?’ (2016) 53 Finance 
and Development 38-41. Available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2016/06/pdf/ostry.pdf.  
28 For an interesting short video overview, see Paul Mason ‘Capitalism is failing. It’s time to panic’ 12 
August 2015 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/video/2015/aug/12/paul-mason-capitalism-
failing-time-to-panic-video.  
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human rights protection, legal culture and international cooperation.29 An enquiry into 
political economy is a means to bring together all these keywords.   
 It may seem puzzling that the Introduction asserted a neglect of an analysis into the 
political economy of global constitutionalism when much of the discourse on 
international constitutionalism began with a scholarly debate on the constitutionalisation 
of the WTO. In the early 2000s, several scholars engaged in the question of whether the 
legalisation of the WTO (particularly given its highly legalised dispute settlement system) 
meant/should mean/should not mean the constitutionalisation of the WTO and the 
economic order more generally.30 This literature was, however, largely concerned with 
the constitutionalisation of the trade regime, not of the international legal order as a 
whole. Given that neoliberal precepts have so permeated thinking on a national, inter- 
and transnational level, one cannot separate the economic order as pertaining simply to a 
commercial or trade sphere. The neoliberal order is at present the only true contender for 
global reach and due to this monopoly on the institutions, regulations, and imagination 
has become naturalised as the only way of ordering globally interconnected affairs. It 
follows therefore that those writing on global constitutionalism would not be aware of the 
particular political economic model they are assuming – they would most likely not have 
given it any thought. With this chapter, I hope to make a small contribution to changing 
this taking-for-granted of the neoliberal dimension of global constitutionalism.  
 
The point of departure which I propose lies in the public/private dichotomy. Global 
constitutionalism and neoliberalism arguably meet and intertwine in the separation of the 
public and the private spheres. Ideas of constitutionalism have historically entailed a 
public/private division whereby the public sphere is considered as the political sphere and 
                                                        
29 Takao Suami, Project Framing Paper, January 2013 (on file with the author).  
30 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘Constitutionalism and International Organizations’ (1997) 17 Northwestern 
Journal of International Relations 398-469; Robert Howse and Kalypso Nicolaidis, ‘Legitimacy and 
Global Governance: Why Constitutionalizing the WTO is a Step too Far’, in Roger B. Porter et al. (eds.) 
Efficiency, Equity, and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium (Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution Press 2001), pp. 227-252; Neil Walker, ‘The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in 
a New Key’, in Grainne de Burca and Joanne Scott (eds.), The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional 
Issues (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2001); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘Human Rights, Constitutionalism and 
the World Trade Organization: Challenges for World Trade Organization Jurisprudence and Civil Society’ 
(2006) 19Leiden Journal of International Law 633-667. 
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the private sphere is the sphere of the economic. 31  Neoliberalism encapsulates this 
division by promoting policies aimed at keeping the market separate and protected from 
state intervention. This private sphere of the economy is taken out of state control and 
therefore out of a form of democratic control. The private sphere, the sphere of the 
economic, is depoliticized. This rationale of the private sphere and deregulation is 
connected to the guiding principle of ‘the invisible hand’ – creating the fiction that law is 
not present in this sphere.32  
 The public/private distinction, as one of the ‘grand dichotomies’ of Western thought,33 
is not a single paired opposition, but rather a complex network of oppositions.34 To 
narrow the possible interpretations of this opposition down, I am interested in its 
evolution in legal history, in particular constitutional history as it relates to international 
law. There are several historical moments which have been explored in this regard. One 
might start with Roman law; one might start with Grotius and his discussions of the 
mercantile rights in the law of nations. I will follow Morton J. Horwitz’ starting point of 
the ‘double movement in modern political and legal thought’.35 The significance in law 
appears to have evolved conceptually in new ideas of territorial sovereignty in the 16th 
and 17th centuries and practically with the industrial revolution and the notion of the 
market. As a response to the emergence of the nation state and notions of sovereignty 
(prompting ideas of a distinct public realm) in the 16th and 17th centuries, there also 
emerged a desire for a sphere which should be free from the power of the state (prompting 
ideas of a distinct private realm). John Locke had a profound impact on the distinction, 
advocating for a right to private property, which he derived from labour. However, as 
Horwitz states, it was not until the emergence of the market as a central legitimating 
                                                        
31 A prominent and familiar debate in which the collapse of the public into the private is emphasised could 
undermine the salience of the public/private distinction in constitutionalism. See eg Martha Minow, 
Partners not Rivals: Privatization and the Public Good (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 2002). This often 
concerns the privatisation of public services such as education and healthcare. However, the abstract and 
symbolic distinction of the two spheres is still very much present in notions of global constitutionalism and, 
significantly, serves a particular ideological function. 
32 Möller (note 11) 275.  
33 Norberto Bobbio, ‘The Great Dichotomy: Public/Private’ in Democracy and Dictatorship: The Nature 
and Limits of State Power (Oxford: Polity Press, 1997). 
34 Jeff Weintraub, ‘The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction’ in Jeff Weintraub and Krishan 
Kumar (eds.), Public and Private in Thought and Practice. Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1997). 
35 Morton J. Horwitz, ‘The History of the Public/Private Distinction’ (1982) University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 1423-1428. 
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institution in the nineteenth century that the public/private distinction was brought into 
the core of legal discourse.36  
 Horowitz writes of the American legal academy furthering the separation between the 
different branches, designating public law fields (constitutional, criminal, regulatory law) 
and private law fields (torts, contracts, property, commercial law). This is attributed to a 
powerful contingent of orthodox judges and jurists who aimed to create a legal science 
that would sharply separate law from politics.37 This project of creating a neutral and 
apolitical science of law was certainly not restricted to the US but was also (previously) 
pursued in Europe.38 Law was to be separated ‘from what was thought to be the dangerous 
and unstable redistributive tendencies of democratic politics’.39 Politics, then, is present 
in public law, but repressed as that which is irrational and biased, and is entirely missing 
in private law. Law schools have continued to teach this strict public/private divide and 
have caused the reproduction of the depoliticisation of law. Duncan Kennedy has 
highlighted that the core law school subjects, contract law, criminal law, property law, 
tort law are not built on the foundation of neutral reasoning, but are ‘the ground-rules of 
late nineteenth-century laissez-faire capitalism’. The primacy of property and restrictions 
on interference with the market are forgrounded as central values.40 The rights to be 
protected are those reflecting the interests of private property owners, businesses, 
multinational corporations and financial capital. Private law, in this understanding, is a 
neutral system which facilitates voluntary market transactions and vindicates injuries to 
private rights.  
 The ideological meaning given to the public/private divide is twofold. First, the public 
must not intervene in the market. Second, law is apolitical. Law is regarded as a rational 
mechanism which can speak reason to power. Law is thought to have progressed to 
                                                        
36 Horwitz (n. 35), at 1424. 
37 Horwitz (n. 35), at 1425. 
38 See Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civiliser of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-
1960 (Cambridge University Press, 2001) for an account of this trend in international law, particularly 
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Bildung as Orientations for Learning and Teaching’ in Bart van Klink and Ubaldus de Vries (eds.), 
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become rational.41 Although the emphases and interpretations of global constitutionalism 
vary, the division between the political and the economic is largely assumed to be post-
political, requiring no further justification. In global constitutionalism, it is taken for 
granted. Global constitutionalism, then, is employed, perhaps largely unwittingly, as a 
vehicle for neoliberalism.  
 
2. Global constitutionalism and East Asian perspectives 
This collection sets out to rethink ‘how both EU and East Asia can contribute to the 
construction of global legal order’.42 Moreover, it advances from the assumption that East 
Asian scholars have not yet joined the discussion on global constitutionalism.43  The 
question which emerges from a political economy lens is: Would the debate with East 
Asian scholars imply a further naturalisation of the public/private divide and therewith a 
bias for neoliberalism? Or, alternatively, could this new dialogue provide an opportunity 
for decolonising global constitutionalism and its political economic bias? 
2.1 Political economy of East Asia 
These sections can only provide a very rough overview, with much detail being omitted 
and generalisations having to be made.44 East Asia is not a monolithic whole and certainly 
the political economic emphases vary greatly. In regard to the ASEAN Plus Three, one 
could generally state that Japan and South Korea are more closely aligned with Western 
political and economic models (and it merits emphasising here that just as East Asia is 
not a monolithic whole, nor is the West with varying degrees of social democratic ideals 
incorporated), than China which is described as a socialist market economy.  
 It is relevant in this context that despite its peaks and troughs, overall East Asia has 
experienced great economic success in the past few decades.45 China’s economic reforms 
(often referred to as ‘Reform and Opening up’) beginning in the late 1970s, and 
implemented in two stages, introduced market principles in the form of decollectivisation 
of agriculture, allowing private entrepreneurs to operate, the privatization of state-owned 
                                                        
41 See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 2012). 
42 Suami (n. 29). 
43 Suami (n. 29). 
44 See other chapters in this collection for a more complete view. 
45 Some of the troughs include Japan’s economic crisis in the 1990s, as well as widespread skepsis as to 
whether China has really grown at the rate that the national statistical office professes. Moreover, at the 
time of writing, there is debate over the end of China’s four-decade ‘growth miracle’. 
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industry and opening up the country to foreign investment. Politically, the Communist 
Party of China has been the sole ruling party since 1949. Japan is a constitutional 
monarchy, which draws much of its current political patterns from the time of the Allied 
occupation at the end of World War II.  Overall, Japan is more integrated into the 
international system. South Korea, commonly simply referred to as Korea, is East Asia’s 
most developed country according to the Human Development Index.46 Overall, East 
Asia has emerged as one of the strongest regions in terms of economic clout and political 
influence.  
 The political economy of East Asia is of course a vast topic, which for lack of space 
and expertise, cannot be developed further here. Two issues of political economy are 
particularly relevant to this study: First, Deng Xiaoping, the Paramount Leader of China 
who led China through its major economic reforms, pursued the dictum that disputes 
regarding sovereignty and territorial integrity should be put to one side in order to further 
economic opening-up and modernization. This effectively created a distinction and 
isolation between the political and the economic where doing business together was 
enabled through a setting aside of territorial disputes.47 Given that the separation of the 
political and the economic is in line with neoliberal and global constitutional tenets, this 
continued policy of China allows an insight into the potential dialogue on global 
constitutionalism with East Asia. Second, it is also relevant here that the East Asian states 
in question were central in displacing the relative hegemony of the North Atlantic 
political and economic centre. Given that the hegemonic potential (and possibly nature) 
of global constitutionalism has been exposed, it would seem relevant that a discourse 
between the former economic hegemon with the current economic hegemon would take 
place largely on terms most familiar to the former hegemon. 
2.2 East Asia and International Law 
Asia’s relationship to international law has been described both as ‘ambivalent’ as well 
as ‘selective’.48 Simon Chesterman argues that Asia ‘benefits most from the security and 
                                                        
46  United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Reports, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI. 
47 Jacques deLisle, ‘Remarks by Jacques deLisle’ (2013) 17 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American 
Society of International Law) 348-352. 
48  Simon Chesterman, ‘Asia’s Ambivalence about International Law and Institutions: Past, Present, 
Futures’ (2017) 27 The European Journal of International Law 945-978; Jacques deLisle, ‘China’s 
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economic dividends provided by international law and institutions and yet is the wariest 
about embracing those rules and structures.’49 Regardless of whether one subscribes to 
this cost-benefit view, Asian countries are certainly cautious about certain aspects of 
international law and at the same time receptive to others. Although at risk of 
overgeneralisation (particularly as regards Japan), it can be claimed that East Asian states 
commonly assert traditional sovereign prerogatives. This approach to international law 
along the traditional Westphalian parameters of sovereignty, sovereign equality and non-
intervention, is sometimes described as ‘Eastphalia’.50 
 This ambivalence towards international law is often presented in its historical context. 
As noted above, international law played a central role in the imperial project, echoes of 
which are still evident in international law today. The exclusion of non-European states 
from full participation in international law was constructed on the basis of a civilisation 
bias which affected East Asian states profoundly.51 Japan was more successful than China 
in being admitted into the circle of civilised states. It was of course itself an imperial 
power (and the only non-Western world power in the late 19th early 20th century), ruling 
over Korea until defeated by the Allies in World War II. However, Japan came to 
experience its otherness in its post World War II occupation and transformation.52 In the 
meantime, China suffered what it refers to as ‘the century of humiliation’ from the mid 
19th to the mid 20th century.53 This began with the Opium Wars between China and, first 
and foremost, Britain. The Opium Wars were military interventions waged for the 
purpose of securing China as a trading ‘partner’ for the import of opium from Britain’s 
colony India. The quest was to legalise opium and to exempt it from any trade duties. In 
turn, Britain wanted access to Chinese tea, silk, and porcelain.54 The unequal treaties and 
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the ceding of Hong Kong to Britain which resulted from China’s defeat in the Opium 
Wars were bitter defeats. Chesterman observes that in order to understand Asian attitudes 
to international law it is not only important to note the humiliation which comes with 
colonialism but also the fact that the vast majority of Asian states ‘literally did not 
participate in the negotiation of most of the agreements that define the modern 
international order’.55  
 There are significant differences within East Asia as regards their attitudes to 
international law, but China’s position in particular deserves some attention, given it is 
the largest in terms of territory and population and has experienced such remarkable 
economic growth. 56  Notably, the Chinese view on international law is described as 
instrumentalist in that it considers international law as an instrument of the state rather 
than a check on it.57  Despite a prominent Asian values debate in the 1990s, and a 
subsequent embrace of relativism and/or pluralism, China today appears more flexible in 
regard to what has been termed ‘conceptual’ aspects of sovereignty as opposed to 
‘spatial’.58 The latter refers to current territorial disputes in the South and East China Sea, 
as well as ongoing claims over Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet. In terms of ‘conceptual’ 
aspects, China has signed most major UN-centred international human rights conventions 
as well as issuing a Human Rights White Paper, Action Plans, and other informal 
documents which engage with human rights obligations of China.59 It is, however, also 
conceded that despite this official stance, this may in part be paying lip-service to 
conceptual aspects, given that sovereign discretion is still largely maintained.60 One area 
of international law in which China is particularly active is in bilateral investment treaties. 
China is party to the second largest number of BITs overall, displaying a clear preference 
for (a) economic agreements and (b) bilateral as opposed to multilateral regimes. 
Although there has been a problematizing and pushback against the reigning supreme of 
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neoliberal tenets in investment treaties and its fundamental investor-friendly approach,61 
there is still no apparent alternative regime which contests the hegemony of the 
Washington Consensus. 
 Against this background of an ‘Eastphalian’ system of sovereignty, it is relevant that 
East Asia has generally not been at the forefront of efforts to ‘decolonise’ international 
law.62  Only few TWAIL scholars come from East Asia. This seems to point to an 
understanding of the instrumentalist vision of international law rather than an interest in 
it as a possible instrument for resisting hegemonic power of Western military and 
economic states. Naturally, this must be seen in relation to China’s position as, at the very 
least, a regional hegemon. Given these preconditions, it would seem that there would only 
be minor interest in discussions on global constitutionalism from a scholarly perspective, 
and even less so from a political perspective.  
2.3 East Asia and Global Constitutionalism 
This section sets the lack of political will to one side and questions what East Asian 
approaches to global constitutionalism may likely look like from a theoretical and 
practical perspective. 
 Domestic perspectives on constitutionalism are relevant here, just as they are for the 
Western scholars writing on global constitutionalism. It can generally be said that in 
parallel to international law’s European origins, constitutionalism is also a legal 
phenomenon brought to East Asia by the West, although not necessarily through 
colonialism. Japan’s constitutional history is interesting in this regard and tells a complex 
story. The Constitution of the Empire of Japan, or the Meiji Constitution, came into force 
in 1890 after a Japanese study mission was sent to various states (including the US, 
France, Spain, the UK and Germany) to enquire into the most appropriate form of 
constitutionalism for Japan. This study mission found the Prussian model to be 
particularly suitable to the Japanese context in its mix of constitutional and absolute 
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monarchy. This is not a story of direct imperialism. In contrast, the Meiji Constitution’s 
successor, Japan’s constitution of 1947 is widely regarded as ‘imposed’ on it as part of 
US General MacArthur’s post World War II plans for economic, political and social 
change. Although studies have softened the ‘imposition’ supposition,63 it can still be 
presumed that the occupying power exercised a great amount of influence on the 
initiation, drafting, and content of the constitution – not least given the fact that it was 
first written in English and only then translated into Japanese. Despite this, the Japanese 
post-war constitution is largely regarded a success, finding legitimacy with the Japanese 
people and considered an effective means of ensuring the rule of law. 
 Turning again to China: China’s current constitution, the Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China, was adopted in 1982 under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership. Modelled 
largely on the 1936 Constitution of the Soviet Union, China is declared a ‘socialist state 
under the people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the 
alliance of workers and peasants’.64 Despite having a constitution, China is criticised as 
not having constitutionalism given the absence of judicial review and the lack of popular 
participation in the enforcement of the constitution.65 A central issue continues to be the 
question whether the constitution has the capacity to put a check on the actions of the 
Party and its leadership. As a general matter, China is suspicious of liberal 
constitutionalism, particularly regarding its potential for a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. 
 A functioning or emergent regional constitutional regime is often viewed as a precursor 
to global constitutionalist thinking, hence the frequent reference to EU constitutionalism 
from advocates of its global interpretation. Asia has, as a general matter, not embraced 
regional unity through common regional institutions. According to its Charter, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) serves legal and political purposes, to 
promote greater political, security, economic, and socio-cultural cooperation.66 Despite 
the various intentions set out in the Charter, ‘a noticeable lack of discourse over the role 
of law and institutions in promoting regionalism in this macro-region’ has been 
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observed.67 This lack of enthusiasm for the role of law and institutions in East Asian 
regionalism may be indicative of a larger lack of enthusiasm for cooperation on 
constitutionalism on an international plane.68  
 Domestic and regional constitutionalism do therefore not offer fertile ground for a 
flourishing debate on global constitutionalism in East Asia. The inflections of 
constitutionalism and international law which go beyond an instrumentalist approach are 
seen with suspicion, particularly by China. This has not, of course, inhibited economic 
relations. Indeed, one could say that economic relations are flourishing, with East Asia 
being a major export and import region; in addition, investment in the region as well as 
by its constituent states in other parts of the world are thriving.69 Overall, one could state 
that given the accepted differences in regard to the public-political landscape, a consensus 
is commonly sought within the economic sphere. As was mentioned above, this is 
reflected in the comparatively high number of bilateral trade agreements vis-à-vis 
multilateral treaties around the common rights.70 The economic is the area in which East-
West relations are at their least contested. But this also tells us something about the 
division of the political and economic in that trade and investment agreements are largely 
regarded as apolitical. This seeming neutrality of the market is, as was argued above, a 
distinct feature of neoliberalism. Despite different ideological foundations, the inherent 
neoliberal flavour of a separation of the public from the private and the attendant 
separation of the political from the economic reigns supreme. In other words, although 
its economic influence is not based on a straight-out neoliberal programme which tries to 
minimise state intervention in the market, China is also not posing a threat to the 
unrivalled Washington Consensus paradigms.71  
 Constitutionalism is revealed, then, to be a distinctly political project, on the domestic, 
regional and global levels. As a political (and social) project, constitutionalism serves the 
interests of some over others. In the global context, which we are interested in, 
constitutionalism in East Asia is far more likely to serve private interests, corporate 
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interests, and their institutions rather than follow a universal higher moral code. This is 
because (a) the constitutional form is already biased towards a separation of the public 
and private, thus depoliticising the sphere of the private, and (b) the constitutional form 
has the ability to ‘lock in’ of ‘fix’ programmes and principles which serve certain 
purposes and interests. 72  The implication of an East-West dialogue on global 
constitutionalism would then, perhaps inadvertently, be a further deepening of the 
separation of the market and therefore the continued inaccessibility of mechanisms of 
redistribution in the political sphere. Such a trend in thinking, or in the institutionalisation 
of this thinking through global constitutionalism, could ultimately mean the deepening of 
economic and social inequality. 
2.4 Opportunities? 
The conversation with East Asian scholars and practitioners regarding global 
constitutionalism may, on the other hand, provide some opportunities: It may unearth the 
hitherto neglected debate on political economy, requiring that which has been naturalised 
to be spelled out. Neoliberalism’s limits have, particularly in the past years, become 
prominent. Sovereign debt, the global financial crisis, the Greek (and other European) 
crises, rising economic inequality, the rise of national populism are all symptoms of the 
problems with neoliberalism. This realisation could not only provide the opportunity to 
rethink global constitutionalism, it could also provide the opportunity to rethink the basis 
of the predominant economic order.  Could this be the introduction of the political into 
the economic/private sphere? 
 Despite the appeal of this proposition, there are some hurdles which are almost 
impossible to overcome. First, a common lowest denominator, however loose, would 
need to capture not only the diverse inter-national laws and practices but also, crucially, 
the trans-national laws and practices on a non-normative basis. Even in a loose form of 
constitutionalism, that of an ‘attitude, a frame of mind’,73 some form of fixing within 
moving processes is required. And if one takes values out of the debate, and if one takes 
the legal form out of the debate, what does this leave us with? Only again an agreement 
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that ‘doing business’ without enquiring into values has worked in the past. The political 
in terms of a democratic and inclusive process would most likely, in practical terms, be 
factored out. An example of this may be detected in China’s approach to the disputes 
arising from the territorial claims made on the South and East China Seas. Chinese policy 
is to ‘set aside’ sovereignty questions to seek cooperation on practical matters such as 
resource development.74  
 Second, the close link between global constitutionalism and international law would, 
it seems, be an inhibitor. A common framework, even in a minimalist sense, would need 
to somehow capture laws and practices which derive from increasingly diverse and 
multiple local, regional and global locations involving both state and nonstate authorities 
and state and nonstate law.75  Not even international law is able to capture these multiform 
processes and events,76 so why would a global constitutionalism? So long as international 
law is unable to account for the role of law in the constitution (as in construction) of local 
and global political economies, its decolonisation through a debate on commonalities 
with non-Western actors is unlikely. Notwithstanding the fantastic efforts of scholars 
from the Global South to engage in this largely Eurocentric debate,77 I believe that there 
is not likely to be much scope for opening global constitutionalism to a truly global idea.  
 Third, and in a related vein, the necessity for constitutionalism’s form to capture 
dynamic processes, even if for a short time only, in fact has a depoliticising effect. 
Constitutionalism is in this sense ‘a mechanism for withdrawing controversial and 
potentially destabilising issues from the parry and thrust of ordinary politics to a less 
inclusive constitutional domain’.78  
 Fourth, aside from these structural biases of the global constitutionalist idea, there is 
unlikely to be a concomitant political will relating to such efforts. Global 
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constitutionalism remains a scholarly debate and there is not a whiff of governmental, 
civil society, or policy interest in it to date. 
 
Conclusion 
At the beginning of this chapter it was asserted that the debate on global constitutionalism 
has at its core the question of whether it can contribute to addressing some of the world’s 
largest problems? In other words, can it contribute to a more equal, prosperous, 
sustainable, and overall better life of humankind? This chapter has highlighted how the 
neglected enquiry into the political economy of global constitutionalism is a crucial 
question in order to get a little closer to answering these ambitious questions. It was found 
that global constitutionalism, with its central parameters of political liberalism 
emphasising the division of the public and the private, plays into the hands of a neoliberal 
political project by depoliticising the economic sphere. Global constitutionalism, if 
enforced or institutionalised beyond its European birthplace, would be unlikely to 
democratise or decolonise global constitutionalism. Rather, it would more likely be a 
further vehicle for the naturalisation of neoliberalism, and at the very least maintain the 
status quo.  
 
 
 
